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The purpose o£ this paper is to study the criteria used in estab-
lishing designated project management in the United States Navy, then to
compare that criteria to organizational theory and industrial practice.
It is hoped that this discussion will improve insight into this form of
organization, currently being utilized to a greater and greater extent,
and that more meaningful and useful criteria for the establishment of
project management can be recommended.
This paper will attempt to clarify and identify project management
and its objectives, present a brief history of this type of organization,
examine the requirements which originally led to selecting designated
projects, and discuss the planning and dec is ion-making process that precedes
the establishment of such a project. It will also discuss the costs and
the benefits of project management and demonstrate why sound criteria for
establishing designated projects are needed.
The specific research question addressed is, what criteria should





PROJECT MANAGEMENT: WHAT IT IS AND WHAT
IT IS EXPECTED TO DO
Defiuing Project management
Project management in the United States Navy is a form of organiza-
tion whose objective is the definition, development and production of a
particular weapon or support system. The project manager is appointed
either by the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Material or the
chief of one of the four bureaus (Ships, Weapons, Supplies and Accounts,
Yards and Docks) . He is given broad authority for directing the develop-
ment and acquisition of a weapon system.
Project management is a general concept that encompasses planning,
control and supervision of developmental engineering, procurement, and
testing of the weapon system or component. It is similar to functional
management in that it is basically getting work done through people, with
all that implies regarding objectives and communications. However, it
differs in some important ways. The project manager has a very specific
objective, i.e., to get a weapon system operational with the allotted
resources as quickly as possible. When this objective is achieved, the
project management organization is disbanded.
John S. Baumgartner, Project Management (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1963), p. 1.
- •
The characteristics of full projectizat ion include the existence
of a project manager of high rank, with a technical and management staff
commensurate with the scope of the project. In order to be effective
the project manager must have the ability to acquire and keep competent
personnel, possess the capacity and authority to perform or supervise
the task of system engineering, be able to control the preparation of the
project budget, and have authority to reallocate his resources. He also
must have ready access to top management, the ability to obtain quick and
accurate support from other elements of the Department of Defense, and the
capability to prepare project development plans.
The Department of Defense directive that established policy
governing the use and application of project management includes this
definition:
System/Project Management: A concept for the technical and
business management of particular systems /projects based on the use
of a designated, centralized management authority who is responsible
for planning, directing, and controlling the definition, development,
and production of a system/project; and for assuring that planning
is accomplished by the organizations responsible for the complementary
functions of logistic and maintenance support, personnel training,
operational testing, activation, or deployment. The centralized
management authority is supported by functional organisations, which
are responsible to the centralized management authority for the
execution of specifically assigned system/project tasks.
1
The term project manager has been used in a variety of situations
to identify billets or positions of greatly differing responsibilities and
authorities at widely divergent organizational levels in the Navy. Various
U. S. Department of Defense, System/Project Management , Directive
No. 5010.14 (May 4, 1965).

other terms such as program, manager, special project officer, systems
manager, project officer, and program officer have also been used to
identify a position or individual with some of the elements of responsi-
bility of a project manager.
As a step toward dispelling this confusing array of terms the
Secretary of the Navy has limited the use of the term project manager to
the head of those organizations that are specifically designated.- A
project can only be named as a designated project by the Secretary of the
Navy, the Chief of Naval Material or one of the bureau chiefs of the
Naval Material Support Establishment.
*
This paper uses the term designated project strictly in adherence
to the policies of the Secretary of the Navy. To emphasize the restricted
use of the term designated project, as of March 2, 1965 there were only
nine such projects under the control of the Chief of Naval Material.*
Designated projects are established by die issuance of a project
charter approved by the Chief of Naval Material. Charters of projects
designated by a bureau chief must also be approved by the Chief of Naval
Material. The charter establishes the scope of authority, responsibility,
and operating relationships of the project manager. Any special delegations
A
U. 5. Department of the Navy, Project Management in the Depart-




U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Material, Designated
Projects Under Command of the Chief of Naval vlaterial , Chief of Naval
Material Notice 5430, ilarch 2, 1965.

1
of authority or necessary exemptions from existing regulations are cited
.
In addition, the charter assigns a definite date when the project will be
reviewed to see if its goals have been substantially met, and if it should
be considered for disestablishment at that time.
The Objectives of Project Management
The Department of Defense has expressed the objectives of project
management as follows:
The exceptional management policies established by this Directive
are intended to:
A. Give particular attention to the management of, and allocation of
resources to, those system projects that are most critical to the
Nation's defense posture or costly to the Department of Defense,
and;
B. Strengthen management authority and effectiveness, particularly
at System/Project Manager level, so that the department of
Defense can acquire, deploy, operate, and support such systems/
projects possessing the performance capabilities required within
the approved schedule and resources made available. *•
The goals inferred from the Department of Defense Directive are
basically to reduce the lead-time required to get a weapon system opera-
tional, and to do this without increasing the requirement for resources.
In an organization as large as the Department of the Navy the
successful and expeditious development of a weapon system involves many
functionally specialized efforts. Project management is an attempt to
1U. S. Department of the Navy, Office of Naval Material, Project
Management in the Naval Material Support Establishment , Chief of Naval
Material Instruction 5000.5A, December 7, 1965.
Department of Defense Directive 5010.14 . p. 3.

provide an organization with a singleness of purpose that will concentrate
the resources, functional talent, and authority necessary to make timely
decisions, recognize and correct problems rapidly and ultimately result in
the achievement of project goals in the most expeditious manner.
The development of atomic and thermonuclear explosives together
vith the ability to deliver them have made it mandatory for our future
security that reliance be placed on forces in being rather than on plans
to mobilize economic, industrial and manpower potentials. As Charles J.
Hitch has stated:
In an all out nuclear war the superior economic war potential
of the United States is important only to the extent that it has
been effectively diverted to security purposes before war starts. 1
The implications are clear that reliance cannot be put on weapon
systems that are on the drawing board. The success of this nation's
defense depends on an inventory of operational weapons of such a capability
that any potential enemy will remain extremely reluctant to attack.
Project management has been the primary organizational innovation
used by the Department of Defense in attempting to maintain an adequate
inventory of deterrent weapons. Proponents of project management do not
claim that this form of organization necessarily develops better weapons
but they do believe it develops them quicker and by so doing helps to
attain and maintain the required forces in being.
Originally project management was viewed as primarily a process
^Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, toss.: Harvard University Press, 1960),
p. 15.

for obtaining the capability to deliver naclear missiles, but recent
developments, especially the war in Vietnam, have brought limited war3
more to the forefront of national defense considerations. Now project
management is being utilized to expedite the acquisition of weapons and
even logistic support capabilities to be used in less than nuclear wars.
An example of a project manager for a logistic support system is the
recently designated Navy project manager for the Fast Deployment Logistic
Ship. While the characteristics of this type of ship have not been
released; from the name itself, it is safe to assume that its primary
mission is to deliver logistic support, not weapons.
Various reports that the USSR has developed \/eapou systems in
half the time that it takes the United States have also added impetus to
the demand for shortening the lead-time for weapon system development.
Peck and Scherer in an esdiaustive report on a study of the weapons ac-
quisition process quote reports that "... the B-52 required eight and
one half years to develop while Bison, the comparable Russian heavy
bomber, took only four and one half years. "^ The authors are somewhat
skeptical of these reports on Russian capabilities; nevertheless, they
recognize that this type of information has increased the Congressional
and public clamor for faster development ox weapon systems for the United
States armed Forces.
i
"U. S. Department of the Navy, Fast Deployment Logistics Ship ;
Department of the Navy Organization and Responsibilities for . Secretary
of the Navy Instruction 5430.75, October 18, 1965.
2Merton J. Peck and Frederick M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis (Boston: Harvard University Graduate
School of Business Administration, 1962).

Project management was and is being used in the belief that it
will reduce the lead-time required to place a weapon system in the hands
of operational units. In the next chapter the history of the development
of project management in the Navy will be reviewed.

CHAPTER II
HISTORY OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN THE NAVY
New organizational management systaus are not often the results
of major breakthroughs as is sometimes the case for technological develop-
ments. The development of management techniques is an evolutionary
process. Many of the elements of project management have no doubt been
utilized by mankind for decades if not centuries. However, the techno-
logical explosion during and since World War II has brought about condi-
tions that make the project manager form of organization desirable.
These technological conditions have caused rapid expansion in the number
and types of potential weapon systems. The Department of Defense has
expressed the opinion that the project management system is the best form
of organization to exploit the potentials of new weapon systems.
The earliest project management organization in the United States
was the Manhattan District project for the development of the atomic bomb.
This organization was formed with a specific development objective and
was given the resources to accomplish that objective as expeditiously as
possible. The success of the Manhattan project was probably responsible
for adoption of the project management approach in evolving weapon systems
when the United States was later threatened during the cold war.
Department of Defense Directive 5010.14 .
8

In the Navy the development of the Polaris missile is usually
cited as the first, the biggest, and the most successful result of
project management.'- The Special Projects Office was established in
November 1955 under Rear Admiral W. F. Rabom to manage the development
of the sea based Polaris ballistic missile. ^ The original mission of the
Special Projects Office was to find a solution to the problems of adapting
the liquid fueled Jupiter missile to shipboard environment. In December
1956, the mission of the Special Projects Office was changed to the
development of a solid propellant missile and the complete fleet bal-
listic missile system. This effort was brought to a successful conclusion
in 1960, three years ahead of schedule .3
However, years before the establishment of the Special Projects
Office, Vice Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (then Captain) headed an organiza-
tion that had many of the attributes of a designated project. Admiral
Rickover and his group were responsible for developing the atomic sub-
marine, from inception of the idea to a reality, in five years. During
approximately the same era it took eight years to get the B47 bomber from
drawing board to its first flight.* Admiral Rickover was never referred
•j
^The Extension of Special Organizational Patterns and Management
Techniques to Additional Weapon Systems , A report prepared for the
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics) by United




U. S. Department of the Navy, From Polaris to Deep Ocean Tech-
nology (Special Project Office, 1964), p. 3.
3
Ibid .
**Clay Blair, Jr., The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1954), p. 261.
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to as a project manager nor is he designated as one today, but his efforts
have been regarded as the most successful accomplishment of a project
1
»
The problem of lead-time in weapon system development has con-
cerned other organisations besides the Navy Department. In 1956, a
Department of Defense study team headed by the then Deputy Secretary of
Defense, Mr. Reuben Robertson, Jr., concluded that it took ten years to
develop a new weapon from concept to operational availability. ^ In 1959,
the House Committee on Government Operations found that the missile
management agencies, project managers for the highest priority missile
systems, had succeeded in significantly reducing the ten year lead-time
cited by the Robertson report.3 Although this report did not use the
term project management, it gave a significant boost to the methods of
organization and control now utilized by a designated project manager.
Two major study groups in the Navy have been concerned in part
vith weapons acquisition problems and project management. In 1959, as
a result of the Franke Board's recommendations, the Bureau of Ordnance
and the Bureau of Aeronautics were merged, forming the Bureau of Naval
Speech by Howard W. Merril, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of the Navy, to the Graduating Class, Defense. Weapon Systems Management
Center, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, March 26, 1965.
2
U. S. Department of Defense, Ad hoc Study Group, Manned Air
Craft Weapon Systems: A Program for Reducing the Time Cycle From Con-
cept to Inventory (The Robertson Report) July, 1956, declassified in
1960.
"^U. S. Congress, House Committee on Government Operations Report,
Organization and hanaseaant of the Missile Programs , H.R. 1121, 86th
Cou2ress, First Session 1959, p. 57.
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Weapons.-'- It was expected that this merger would establish a logical
place for the assignment of present project managers such as the Director,
Special Projects Office and for future project managers. In 1962, the
Review of the Management of the Navy, the Dillon Report, was also con-
cerned with the centralization of project managers. Thi3 report stated:
Of all the compelling reasons for the establishment of a cohesive
Naval Support organization, the most fundamental is the need for
strong, centralized project managemenc. Only by having an authorita-
tive project manager at a sufficiently high level in the support
organization can the Navy effectively manage its most important
programs, many of which involve more than one material bureau.
Project Managers for the Navy's most significant projects would
individually report directly to the Chief of Naval Support. Of high
rani; commensurate with the task assigned, the Project Manager would
have complete authority, derived from the Chief of Naval Support,
for the executive direction of his assigned project .2
The Chief of Naval Support referred to above is the name used by
the Dillon Committee for the Chief of Naval Material. The Office of Naval
Material, as envisioned by the Dillon Board insofar as project management
is concerned, was established in November, 1963.° On the staff of the
Chief of Naval Material is a division, headed by a senior Navy captain,
which is responsible for preparing staff studies to determine recom-
mendations for the designation of projects, preparing and circulating
proposed project manager charters, recommending staffing for designated
U. S. Department of the Navy, Report of the Committee on Organisa-
tion of the Department of the Navy (NAV EXOS P-1996), 1959.
nJ. S. Department of the Navy, Review of the Management of the
Navy , 15 December 1962, Vol. I, p. 141.
"*U. S. Department of the Navy, Naval iiatarial Support Establish-




projects and reviewing die status of accomplishments of previously desi- -
nated projects.
In 1964, the Secretary of the Navy established the position
The Special Assistant to the Secretary and appointed Howard W. Merrill
to fill it. Mr. Merrill was charged among other things with the
responsibility of Mirtug greater use of Project Management.
The nuclear power plant organization headed by Admiral Richover
and the Polaris missile team of Admiral Raborn were established in the
early and mid-fifties. There was no further escalation in the use of
project management in the Navy until the Surface Missile System Project
was designated as a project on 26 February 1964,2 after the establishment
of the post of Chief of Naval Material. Since the designation of the
Surface Missile System Project two more projects have been designated by
Secretary of the Navy, six by the Chief of Naval Material and eighteen
by the bureau chiefs. Appendix I contains a complete list of designated
projects and the official instructions for each project. It is up to date
as of 1 February 1966.
iSpeech by Earl Kuhl, Director, Systems Development Di^isii
Office of Management Information, Department of the Navy, to the Navy
Financial Management Class, The George Washington University, January 12,
1966.
U. S. Department o.T the Navy, Surface Missile Systems Project ;
Navy Department -Organization awl Responslbllitias For , (Secretary of
uavy Instruction 5430.56A), February 2C, 1964.

CHAPTER III
THE PLANNING PROCESS PRECEDING SELECTION
OF A DESIGNATED PROJECT
The evolutionary planning process that results in the selection
of a designated project begins with the issuance of a general operational
requirement (GOR) by the Chief of Naval Operations. 1 A GOR is prepared
for each functional warfare and support area. This document states, in
relatively broad yet significant terms, the capabilities that the Navy
requires within an area.2 Estimates of present and potential future
enemy threats are set forth. The GOR encourages research and exploratory
development in the areas of the Navy's most pressing needs. Technical
bureaus are encouraged to submit development proposals that might fulfill
the operational needs stated in the GOR. The GOR provides guidance in
making trade-offs in weapon design by providing information on the relative
importance of the various capabilities desired. It also provides as much
information as possible concerning operational concepts.
After assessing the capabilities needed to meet future military
requirements as projected by the GOR and other long-range strategic and
*-U. S. Department of the Navy, General Operational Requirements ,
Instruction for Preparation of (Chief of Naval Operations Instruction
3910.9), June 24, 1964.
HJ. S. Department of the Navy, RDT&B Management Guide (NAVSO




tactical studies, the Chief of Naval Development may promulgate an Ex-
ploratory Development Requirement (EDR). This document states the need
for investigations and studies to demonstrate new techniques in func-
tional areas, or the feasibility of a system, subsystem or component.
The EDR encourages development effort toward the expansion of naval
capabilities through application of advances in technology. To do this
the EDR directs activities toward the solution of specific military
problems but not to the extent of developing hardware for experimental
or operational testing. From these activities it is hoped that the pool
of technical knowledge can be expanded, resulting in the discovery and
development of future weapon systems.*-
When a new specific capability is required, the Chief of Naval
Operations or the Commandant of the Marine Corps issues a Tentative
Specific Operational Requirement (TSOR). This document states the need
for developing a particular operational capability and describes the
identifiable characteristics necessary in the weapon system to fulfill
the requirement. The TSOR outlines tiie performance goals and provides
other guidance, such as information on the plan for use of a particular
system and guidelines for weighing alternatives and making tradeoffs in
order to achieve the best possible results.
^
*U. S. Department of the Navy, Exploratory Development Require-
ments , (Chief of Naval Material Instruction 3910.4), Hay 1, 1965.
2U. S. Department of the Navy, Specific Operational Requirements
(SOR) and Tentative Operational Requirements (TSOR); Instructions for
Preparation of . (Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3910.6B), June 11,
1964.
'
In response to a TSOR tlie Chief of Naval Material may initiate a
Proposed Technical Approach (PTA). The PTA proposes feasible alternatives
in accomplishing the objectives set forth by the TSOR. Each proposed
alternative is supported by data concerning costs and benefits. The
PTA emphasizes alternative technical, as well as alternative operational,
approaches to providing for the stated requirement. It provides the
best available estimates on trade-off options of cost versus time and cost
versus performance. The goal of the PTA is to provide the Chief of Naval
Operations and/or the Commandant of the liarine Corps with enough informa-
tion on costs, available alternatives, and potential military worth so
that a sound decision can be made before initiating more specific require-
ments. 1
New weapon system ideas have been generated at such a rate during
the last two decades that there is no shortage of innovations . The
problem is to decide which of many systems, subsystems and components
are worth pursuing. The Proposed Technical Approach is extremely im-
portant in leading to the bast choices for development.
The next step in the planning process is the Advanced Development
Objective (ADO). This document issued by the Chief of Naval Operations
describes a requirement for an experimental development which is not yet
considered a certainty as to its military usefulness, technical feasibility
or cost acceptability. The ADO outlines chc?. necessary step between
U. S. Department of the Navy, Proposed Technical Approaches ;
Instructions for I reparation of (Chief of Kavftl Operations Instruction
3910.8), February 28, 1964.
2Peck and Scherer, p. 237.
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exploratory development and engineering development. The primary function
of the ADO is to develop enough information so that hardware can be
developed for test purposes and eventually allow the issuance of a Specific
Operational Requirement .1-
The Specific Operational Requirement is a statement by the Chief
of Naval Operations and/or the Commandant of the Marine Corps outlining
the need for a particular capability and describing the characteristics
of the system. The SOR defines performance requirements throughout the
system's operational environment; it establishes reliability and main-
tainability goals and personnel requirements. The SOR is the final step
in the definition of requirements and contains comprehensive guidance to
the Chief of Naval Material for use in developing an adequate Technical
Development Plan. The SOR is the key decision in the transition from
research to systems development.^
In response to the SOR the Chief of Naval Material prepares a
Technical Development Plan (TDP).3 Compared to the Proposed Technical
Approach, preparation of the TDP is expensive in terms of time, money and
talent. The TDP is a comprehensive and definitive plan for the development
of a specific system. For a complex weapon system the TDP may run to
hundreds of pages and represent up to a half million dollars of investment
in planning and technical effort. A TDP may be either prepared by a Navy
1RDT&E Management Guide .
2Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3910.6.
3U. S. Department of the Navy, Technical Development Plan (Chief
of Naval Operations Instruction 3910 ,4B), June 24, 1964.
9I
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laboratory or contracted to industry.*-
The Secretary of Defense requires a Project Definition Phase
(PDP) for projects requiring $25 million or taore of Research Development,
Test and Evaluation funding and for projects involving $100 million or
more for production funding. * 'Hie PDP is a formal step in the develop-
ment process involving preliminary engineering, contract and management
planning prior to the award of a full-scale development contract. On
potentially large projects tne PDP may be prepared by two or more com-
peting contractors all working closely with Navy representatives.
The ultimate objective of the Project Definition Phase is to
provide a suitable basis for the assurance that management decisions to
pursue, change or cancel development projects are based on the best pos-
sible information concerning realistic cosu, schedule, and performance
estimates.
During the preparation of the Technical Development Plan and/or
the Project Definition Phase, the Secretary of the Wavy, the Chief of Naval
Material or one of the material bureau chiefs must consider whether or
not to declare the project as a designated project. The alternative is to
assign it to one of the material bureaus where it. would be handled routinely
as one of a large number of projects.
*RDT&S Hanagieaient: Guide .
~U. S, Department of Defense, Project Definition Phase (Directive
Ho. 3200.9), August 1, 1963.
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la the next chapter, the costs and benefits of project management
and other considerations involved in deciding vThether or not a work effort
should be designated as a project will be discussed.

CHAPTER IV
BENEFITS AND COSTS OF PROJECT MANAGEMENT
The subject of project management is a controversial one among
management personnel of the Navy. The objective of this chapter is to
delineate the lines of the disagreement and in so doing establish the
reasons why it is essential that sound criteria be used in deciding
whether or not a project is assigned the status of a designated project.
The development of weapon systems is by far the largest single
element of government spending. ^ When this fact is considered in the
light of the urgency of our national defense, it is clear that weapon
systems must be developed as expeditiously and economically as possible.
Any form of organization or method of management that assists in the
realization of this goal obviously must be considered.
The Secretary of Defense has made it clear that he considers
project management an important technique and has directed that it be
used under certain specified conditions.^ The Secretary of the Navy has
also expressed the same policy. In a statement before the Joint Session
of the Committee on Armed Services and the Defense Subcommittee of the
Committee on Appropriations, the Secretary of the Navy Mr. Paul H. Nitze
said:
Peck and Scherer, p. 95.
2




Since the naval Material Support Establishment was established
last year we have been making considerable use of designated project
management in Navy material programs. The concept calls for organiza-
tion of a special management group oriented to producing a single
weapon system or a family of related systems directed at a single
Navy mission. The project management group is superimposed on existing
functional organizations within the Material Bureaus. The Special
Projects Office, which developed the SOLARIS, was the first such group
in the Navy, and the ,!3-T" or Surface Missile Systems Project is in
some ways the most ambitious project management effort we have attempted
to date. Additional project managers have been designated for the
F-lllB/PHOENIX Air Superiority Weapons System and for the Automatic
Carrier Landing System. He expect to make further use of this manage-
ment technique in the future.
*
On the other hand, Rear Admiral William A. Brockett and Rear
Admiral Charles A. Curtze of the Bureau of Ships, both cited the in-
creasing use of project management as one of their reasons for early
retirement from the Navy.^ They both felt that the increasing use of
project management was undermining the importance of their functions in
the Bureau.
Since project management changes the roles, status, functions
and purposes of many traditional organizational units in the Navy, it is
not surprising that there is disagreement on its costs and benefits. The
rest of this chapter will discuss these coses and benefits.
The Benefits of Project Management
The ultimate purported benefit of project management is to shorten
the time from the inception of the development of a vzeapon system until
the time when it is operationally deployed. It is believed that the project
manager with his single management authority and responsibility for design,
development, production, evaluation and support of the complete operational
Paul H. Nitze, quoted in U. S. Department of the Navy, Budget
Digest Fiscal Year 1966 (NAV P-1355), November 30, 1965.
Washington Post . October 28, 1965, p. 1.
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system is able to shorten the tine required for weapon system development.*
One of the advantages of project management that makes possible
achievement of this objective is the capability of faster decision making.
A project manager by himself has the authority and capability to make
decisions that ordinarily could be made by the functional part of the
Navy organization only after clearance by affected activities and numerous
committee conferences to resolve differences of opinion.
2
To coordinate activities with faster decision making, the ideal
project manages; under this system, should have the ability to recognize
and correct problems more quickly than under other methods of project
development. 3 This quicker reaction to solving problems is a very importa.
advantage in the development of a new weapon system. The uncertainties of
major new programs are so great that a multitude of problems is always
present. The prompt resolution of these problems is essential if the
objective of shorter lead-time is to be obtained.
A single authority, responsible for all components, sub-systems
and interface problems
t
should assure their compatibility.^ When two or
more organizational units develop components or sub-systems, as is often
the case in the Navy bureaus, the recognition and resolution of compatibility
*A speech by J. M. Beggs, Program Management — Authority and
kaspoosibility . to the Department of Defense Conference on Program Manage-
ment, May 12, 1963.
2
Ibid .
3Chief of Naval Material Instruction 5QQQ.5A.




problems is more difficult than when one official is responsible for all
decisions affecting the system.
Trade-off decisions made during design and development are based
upon the considerations of toe total system and not upon their effect on
a component or sub-system.^- A functional organization may in all con-
scientiousness make trade-off decisions concerning a component or sub-
system without tolag a/are o': the potential effect on other units. Trade-
off decisions made by a project manager and based on full and complete
information should avoid unpleasant interface controversies by resolving
bureau conflicts or bringing the problems to the proper higher authority
for resolution.
Mr. J. M. Beggs has also cited some other advantages:
First, because of the close association of all members of the
program team, a great deal of cross-fertilization in technical and,
more important, management areas takes place between companies,
industries, laboratories and government. Second, the concept
places emphasis on new techniques and organization with resulting
study and experimentation, and third, there has been a general up-
grading of the planning function vita resultant better understanding
of defense and industry problems . Indeed, a revolution in 1out-
range planning is currently taking place which can largely be traced
to the program management concept. These advantages are of tran-
scending importance in tue acquisition of highly complex major
weapons systems.
One of the new techniques used for long-range planning was developed,
or at least perfected, by a project manager. PERT, Program Evaluation and
Review Technique, was at least partially developed by the Special Projects
Office, the Navy's designated project for the Polaris Fleet Ballistic Hissile.
This technique is now widely accepted and used by government and industry.-
1
Ibid . 2Ibid .
3
From Polaris to Deep Ocean Technology .
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Project management helps keep Navy's top officials better in-
formed on weapon system development progress and problems. In addition
to regular reporting by his organization, the project manager personally
appears before the Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval Operations,
Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Material at least
every six months at the Secretary of the Navy's Management Information
Center briefings .*•
The Navy top managers are of the opinion that the investment in
long-range planning, such as performed by project managers, ha3 paid
definite dividends in the form of better allocation of resources and by
2
reducing development lead time.
Some proponents of project management center their arguments on
the weakness of functional management. The traditional bureau organiza-
tion of the Navy is a form of functional organization. Mr. Koswell
Gilpatric, then the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics) .in a speech before the Defense Conference on Program Management,
May 1963, quoted Peter Drucker on the weaknesses of functional organization
as follows:
But even proper functional organisation by stage of process does
not adequately serve the structural retirements of the business. It
makes it difficult to focus on business performance. Every functional
manager considers his function the most important one, tries to build
it up and is prone to subordinate the welfare of the other functions,
if not of the entire business, to the interests of his unit. There is
no real remedy against this tendency in the functional organization.
The lust for aggrandizement on the part of each function is a result




Oi> lijCUCiiiiL' BUM ISM
a specialty, and on a ma's acquiring the tcnowiedf
that pertains to it. Yet tha functional specialist amy become so
narrow la his vision* his skills sad his loyalties as to be totally
unfit for scnarel management.
A further wasfrnssa is tha difficulty of setting objectives ia tha
functional pattern and of nessurlng the results of functional work. Tor
tha function bb such is concerned with a part of the business* not with
its whole. Its objectives will therefore tend to he set in terns of
* rrrofesitlemel standards 1 rather then in tanas of the success of ***
business* They will tend to direct the attention and efforts of
away from business success rather than toward it, will tend too often
to emphasise and to reward the wrong things*
of this, functional organtestion leads to levels upon levels
of oenagomeot, it can rarely train or test s nan in business performance,
sad almost never in a position where he has full responsibility for
results. And, largely because it aaeds naay levels, it tends to erode
the meaning of each Job and to make it appear nothing but a stepping*
stone to a promotion*
The Air Force also extensively uses project management. In
mentiuc on the rootonfl for this, Lieutenant General Howell Betas has Indl*
cated that the parochial staff organisations of the Air Force, with their
responses that are required in the development of new systems.2 One
official, who requested that he not be quoted, stated that, la his opinion,
the evolution of project management in the Navy was directly due to the
Inability of the material bureaus to get the Jab done, either because of
Possibly due to the fact that project management is held In high
by the Department of Defense and the Department of tha Navy, in
Peter Drucker, The Practice of Management (Hew York: Harper and
Brothers, 1954), p. 208.
Howell H. Bates, Lt. Gen., "You isstt Provide A Streamlined Procedure/
r, 1961), p* 14.

recent years there have been relatively few published reports on the
negative effects of project management. Some writers and speakers have
cited "limitations" after giving the advantages of project management .*
One person interviewed summed up the attitudes implied by many others
when he said, "Project management is effective, but it is expensive,"2
The expense referred to is the use of managerial and technical talent,
not in the cost of weapons.
One of the negative aspects of project management is the fact that
it establishes an elite group, which has historically been disrupting to
the non-elite. ^ The establishment of such a group tends to siphon off
the elite for the "important" project management tasks and leaves the
non-elite performing other jobs. This often results in the elite de-
pending on the non-elite for support services and may cause an unac-
ceptable downgrading of the non-elite's work. Peck and Scherer have
described this possibility as follows:
The time of top policy makers is limited, as is the supply of
outstanding program managers and technical specialists. If too
many elite project groups are established, excessive delegation of
decisions to subordinates, serious understaffing of lower priority
project groups, and/or ineffective coordination among programs will
undoubtedly occur
.
Speech by Simon Ramo, The Program 21anager — Substance or Symbol ,
to the Defense Conference on Program Management, Hay 12, 1963.
^Interview with Allen Cook, of the Project Management Branch,
Planning Division, Office of Naval Material.
3
Resources Management. Systems/Project Management . Unpublished
report, (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces,
1965).
4Peck and Scherer, p. 34.
.
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Another disadvantage of project management is the fact that the
requirements for documentation and reporting are extremely onerous and
consume a great amount of time on the part of the project manager and
his key subordinates.
The Chief of Naval Material assigns a requirement for 32 distinct
responsibilities to a designated project manager.*- Many of these require-
ments involve documenting not required by non-designated projects. In
particular, the designated project manager must prepare a comprehensive
Project Master Plan immediately upon official notification of his ap-
pointment. 2
The Project Master Plan must include:
1. Historical data of the technical feasibility determinations
and decisions which prompted the initiation of the new weapon
system.
2. The documentation of the currant approved requirement to be
satisfied by the execution of the project.
3. A summary of highlights of project data that is most
significant to Navy and Defense top managers.
4. A description in narrative teras, and graphically illustrated .
of the physical and operational characteristics of the
system.
Chief of Naval Material Instruction 5000.5A .
2U. S. Department of the Navy, Guide for the Preparation of










5* A detailed aanageaent plan describing the organization
>
management control systems and other essential informa-
tion.
6. A project milestone plan that selects and identifies events
that are or major importance toward achieving the weapon
system objectives.
7. A plan for conducting the Project Definition Phase.
8. A plan for system development effort from authorization
of development through test, evaluation and up to approval
for service use.
9. The documentation of current production, installation and
base loading plans for the system to provide operational
and logiscic planners responsible for fleet introduction
and support with adequate information.
10. An integrated logistic support plan to ensure the develop-
ment of effective logistic support.
11. A personnel and training plan to provide planned estimates
of the military and civilian training and manpower require-
ments of the weapon system.
12. A financial plan encompassing the costs of the projected
life cycle of the project.
13. A systems effectiveness plan for achieving the required




14. The outlining of the progress reporting system, including
significant potential problem areas.
From these requirements it is obvious that the preparing and
maintaining of the Project Master Plan is a task of considerable magni-
tude. There is a possibility that this effort will prove worthwhile
only in the case of projects of national urgency.
In an effort toward providing the requirement for personnel
trained in the management techniques used by project managers, the
Department of Defense established the Defense Weapon System Management
Center.* In a memo dated 10 March, 1964 to the Secretaries of the
Military Departments, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering,
the Assistant Secretaries of Defense and the Special Assistant and
Assistants to the Secretary, Mr. Cyrus Vance, then Deputy Secretary of
Defense, stated the purpose of this training as follows:
The training should prepare the potential program manager to
analyze the problems and proposed actions submitted by his subor-
dinates and by industry and to take effective action. Emphasis
should be placed on the solution of typical weapons systems
management problems, and a close relationship maintained between
the actual problems encountered in this work and the curriculum.
The curriculum should contain a balanced emphasis on the
problems of technical development, activities, procurement,
budgeting, programming, cost and schedule analysis, production,
facilities, logistical support, and the best techniques avail-
able for management problem display and analysis. The curriculum
may also contain service peculiar regulations and procedures,
but not to the subordination of its main purpose.
U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Weapon Systems Management
Center (Directive No, 5160.55), October 26, 1965.
.:
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Without considering the possible long-range beneficial effects
of this type training it is obvious that the program envisioned by Mr.
Vance will be executed at the cost of a sizeable investment in talent and
facilities
.
A summary of the benefits acclaimed for project management shows
that they are substantial. The reduced lead-time, from inception of
development to the operational deployment of a major weapon system,
is obviously of major importance during the present cold war situation.
The recent advances in technology have made it imperative that weapons
be developed and ready before the outbreak of hostilities. No longer
can the industrial might of the United States wait until war starts and
then commence mobilization. The proponents of project management claim
to have evidence that this form of organization has reduced lead-time
for weapon systems development.* However, the evidence is not conclu-
sive. One factor, whose effect cannot be measured, is the impact of
national priority on the weapon systems that were developed in less than
the projected lead-time. ^ Any program that is universally recognized as
essential to national security might well receive enough attention and
expeditious handling to shorten lead-time, regardless of the form of
management or organization.
Criticism of project management shows that the costs in the
morale of functional talent required to do the voluminous documentation,
the dilution of skilled personnel and the effort required to train




personnel for project management duties are considerable.
The significance of the potential gains from project management
and the substantial costs of this form of organization make it essential
that a decision to declare a project as a designated project be carefully
considered and that sound criteria for its designation be established.
The next chapter will discuss the present officially promulgated criteria
and other guidelines concerning the selection of weapon or support systems
to be managed as designated projects.

CHAPTER V
CRITERIA FOR ESTABLISHING DESIGNATED PROJECTS
The Search for Criteria Within
the Department of Defease
In order to find out if project management could be expanded to
include projects of lesser importance than those in the national urgency
category, the Department of Defense contracted with the United Research
Corporation of Cambridge, Massachusetts to perform a study. In January
1962, this contract resulted in the completion of a report entitled,
"The Extension of Special Organizational Patterns and Management Tech-
niques to Additional Weapon Sys terns. "*
The study examined the organization and management control
systems that had been used by previously established designated projects.
The present designated projects were evaluated as to accomplishments in
performance of the weapon system, time compression from concept to
operational capability and costs incurred.
In evaluating the performance aspect, United Research personnel
tried to determine if the weapon developed did what it was supposed to
do with tolerable reliability. They concluded that :'on balance" the six
United Research Report, The Extension of Organizational Patterns
and Management Techniques to Additional Weapon Systems , A report prepared





programs studied appear to have done well as far as performance of the
system is concerned. 1
To evaluate time compression, the United Research study attempted
to establish whether or not a system was delivered on schedule against
tignt time constraint. It concluded that the performance of project
managers in meeting or beating time schedules was outstanding and that
time compression was probably the most important characteristic of the
projects studied.
In judging the effectiveness of economical performance the United
Research study measured actual cost against original estimates. Un-
certainties make this procedure an unreliable technique and the report
conceded the need for a better means of measurement, although it could
offer none. Nevertheless, the report indicates that the costs of all
projects studied substantially exceeded the original estimates and al-
though the exact causes for such cost overruns could not be identified,
possibilities cited were: a lack of economy in the conduct of the
program, the changing dimensions of the projects in terms of numbers
of weapons or their specifications, the basic difficulties in forecasting
costs of advanced weapons, or a combination of all of these. Peck and
Scherer observe that the weapons acquisition process is often unfavorably
compared with the development process for commercial products but that
when commercial developments push the state of the art the same problems
occur: costs overrun, target dates slip and the product fails to meet
1 2
Ibid ., pp. 1-10. Ibid ., pp. 1-9.




performance promises.* This leads to the presumption that there is no
sound method of determining whether or not the performance of the designated
projects has been economical in the total costs of the v?uapons delivered.
After the study of the records of previously designated projects,
United Research investigated the possibility of extending project status
to additional Navy programs. The report on this subject reads as
follows:
The extension of anything approaching full projectization to
additional Navy programs would almost certainly be greeted with
vigorous resistance by Bureau personnel and perhaps by many
individuals and offices within CNO and other parts of the Navy.
Nevertheless, on a selected basis, it is believed that a con-
siderable degree of projectization could be applied to several
Navy programs without the dire consequences so confidently pre-
dicted by many persons who were interviewed in the Navy. The
selection of programs to which a measure of projectization should
be applied will require considerable care. To have a chance of
success, the program must be of importance to the over-all mission
and future survival of the Navy as an independent entity. It must
be a relatively high priority project, involving considerable
complexity. At the same time, if it involves a technological area
in which there is a real scarcity of in-house technical personnel,
it will tend to have some adverse effect on the existing capability
of the technical bureaus.
2
This generalized and qualified statement offers little guidance
for the useful criteria needed for selecting designated projects. To
tackle this problem of useful criteria United Research developed a set
of weights for urgency, complexity and concurrency. Urgency is con-
sidered in the context of requiring time compression, complexity is
concerned with many technical and interface problems, and concurrency
Peck and Scherer, p. 8.
united Research Report, pp. 5-3.
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is used in the sense that steps such as development, production, training,
site location and construction are not taken sequentially but in such a
manner as to maximize time compression.^- The report admits that it is
especially difficult to assign these weights and that the approach
contains so many qualitative judgements that it is extremely crude.
The formal recommendations of the United Research report include
only the following brief statement on the subject of criteria for selecting
designated projects:
The Navy should be urged to extend project ization to at least
a small number of selected programs within BuWeps and SuShips.
The criteria for selection should be relatively high urgency,
importance to the Navy mission and programs involving technical
areas in which the Navy has a reasonable number of high quality
personnel. Care should be taken that project officers are granted
adequate authority and resources for carrying out their responsi-
bilities.
Although the usefulness of the recommendations of the united
Research Report appears limited, the report does provide substantial
background information and some insight into the question of the required
criteria for establishing designated projects.
In 1963, in New London, Connecticut, the Department of Defense
held the Defense Conference on Program Management,^ which was totally
concerned with project management as defined in Chapter I. The then
assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), Thomas D.
Morris called the conference to:
1 2
Ibid ., pp. 6-6. Ibid ., p. ii.
3
U. S. Department of Defense, Defense Conference on Program




. a . explore with key personnel throughout the Department of
Defense the benefits and problems which exist in specialized manage-
ment and to explore and recommend actions which will improve this
method of management in all services.
Although the conference was concerned with other matters in
addition to criteria for establishing designated projects, this subject
was near the top when agenda items were solicited:
Generally, replies ceuld include but are not limited to: De-
partment of Defense and other policies or controls; the method of
selection of projects for special management; the authorities and
responsibilities of the manager; the organization and staffing of
the management office; the methods for planning and scheduling
engineering, production, and support of a special project; the
techniques for budgeting and control of funds; the procedures for
issuing directives, reporting, and communication techniques; the
control of the contract effort; the techniques for evaluation and
decision making; and the concepts for updating the state of science
and technology within the project.
2
Present at this conference were representatives from the office
of the Secretary of the Navy, Office of Naval Material, Office of Naval
Research, the Chief of Naval Operations Staff, Headquarters Marine Corps,
Bureau of Naval Personnel, Bureau of Naval Weapons, Bureau of Ships,
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Bureau or Yards and Docks, the Special
Projects Office, counterpart agencies of the Army and Air Force, Depart-
ment of Defense, Bureau of the Budget, Atomic Energy Commission and the
national Aeronautics and Space Agency.-
nJ. S. Department of Defense, "Defense Conference on Program
Management," a letter to the Navy Department, Chief, Bureau of Naval




U. S. Department of Defense, "Discussion Outlines for the Defense
Conference on Program ManagCijent , " Washington, 1963.
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The Bureau of Naval Weapons submitted 74 recommended agenda
Items, three of them related to the selection of criteria for the estab-
lishment of designated projects. 1 Item number eight was, "What degree o£
complexity and/or criticality warrants the selection and placement of
projects under specialized management?" The comments submitted en this
question by the Bureau of Naval Weapons were as follows:
All programs of ©tie million dollars or more should be subject
to program management controls to insure proper balance, economic
utilisation of resources and timely delivery. Programs of greater
cost will also have an added degree of complexity and therefore
warrant greater management depth and scrutiny. Only those programs
which are critical because of considerable cost, numerous diffi-
culties, or priority established by the high service echelon should
be permitted to install a vertical organization and then only for
the duration absolutely required. Personnel ceiling controls do
not permit many vertical organizations and each time these are
created there may be an adverse affect on other programs. 2
The twenty-fifth agenda item submitted by the Bureau of Naval
Weapons was, "In your opinion what is the lowest level at which a
project should be placed under systems management?" The accompanying
comment read as follows:
The level of management at which a project should be placed
for systems management will vary. Factors to be considered in
placement are the importance of the project, the difficulties
and the complexities that are expected to be encountered, the
priority of the project and the amount of funds involved. Other
similar systems (family groups) should also be considered. It
may be found that a group of projects of similar characteristics
should be established at a high echelon level. On the other hand,
effective management of a system might be adequately realized at
U. S. Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Weapons, 'List
of Topics for Defense} Conference on Program Management,' 1 Washington, 1963.
Ibid ., p. 5.
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a middle-management level. Projects should not be over-managed
at any level.*
The thirty-second Item was specifically directed to the question
of criteria, asking, "From your experience, is there a set of criteria
that can be established for determination of those projects to be placed
under systems management?'' Comment on this question was as follows:
A project or program which is proposed and is expected to
encounter difficulties of a technical nature, or is a complex pro-
gram requiring a high degree of coordination and control, should
become subject to systems management. The amount of funds involved
in the proposed project or program is also an important but not
necessarily a controlling factor. For example, a program in pro-
duction phase with a high number of production units with a nominal
unit cost may total a large sum, but due to the repetitive nature
and lack of production problems would not require a system manager
merely due to the funds involved. A satisfactory degree of manage-
ment could be devoted to the program by a manager having several
such programs under his production cognizance. If a program is
behind time to the extent that it seriously affects mission capabil-
ity or affects other affiliated systems or subsystems of an important
nature, then systems management may be warranted .2
At the New London Conference, the attendees were organized into
fourteen panels. Panel number one was given the task of discussing
basic concepts and policies involved in the management of systems and
the production of military equipment .3 The first major topic on the
agenda for this panel was, 'The selection of systems and programs for
special management treatment ." The panel report on this subject
appeared in the conference proceedings as follows:
XIbid ., p. 17.
2
Ibid ., p. 21.
3




Criteria for Projectization of a Program
The panel has further agreed that one or more of the following
criteria nay be sufficient to warrant projectization and the assign*





3* National priority — Urgent military necessity
4. High cost
5. Multiple agency interest
6. Top level interest
7. Project difficulties. 1
The criteria contained in the Department of Defense directive,
which was published subsequent to the New London Conference, so closely
parallel the panel's recommendations that it is a safe assumption that
these recommendations were reviewed and given strong consideration by
the Office of the Secretary of Defense.




OFFICIAL CRITERIA OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
In Department of Defense Directive 3010.14 of 5 May, 1965, the
Secretary of Defense prescribed the policy to be followed in using
project management in the Department of Defense .* This instruction
includes criteria for the selection of project management as well as
policy statements and objectives. The criteria cited in the instruction
circumscribe the types of weapon or support systems to be designated as
projects.
The Department of Deiense instruction prescribes conditions
under which it is mandatory < o use project management; it also presents
guidelines for using project suanageaent for projects that do not fall
under the mandatory ra^uiremants. The mandatory requirements include
two basic categories. The first requires that all new systems or major
modifications to existing systems that are rated in the highest priority
(BRICK-BAT) of national urgency be managed under a designated project
manager. The priority projects of national urgency are cited in Depart-
ment of Defense Directive S 4410.3, a secret publication. Since the
directive is classified as secret, the contents cannot be cited at present;
however, weapon systems that were in the national urgency category during
Hjaller C. Moore, "All Echelons State Policy on Project Manage-




the 1950's include the Atlas, Titan and liinuteaian ballistic missiles,
the Nike-Zeus missile defense system, the ballistic missile early warning
system and the Polaris fleet ballistic missile.
1
The second category of mandatory application concerns the naming
of net? programs as designated projects when it is estimated that the
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RD1&E) requirement for funding
will exceed twenty-five million dollars or the estimated funds for pro-
duction will exceed one hundred million dollars. This category applies
to new systems and major modifications of existing systems.
For the selection of designated projects, not in the mandatory
classification, the Department of Defense has stated that the program
should have one or more of the following attributes:
1. Have a significant effect on United States military posture;
2. Are closely related and when taken collectively, would
qualify for this exceptional management under the threshold, are
estimated to require total cumulative RDT&2 financing in excess
of twenty-five million dollars, or are estimated to require total
production investment; in excess of one hundred million dollars;
'J, Are conducted on a substantially concurrent basis,
particularly when significant technical problems are anticipated;
4. Involve unusual organizational complexity or technological
advancement
;
5. Require extensive interdepartmental, national, international
coordination or support; or
6. Present unusual difficulties which need expeditious handling
to satisfy an urgent requirement
.
^United Research Report, p. 1-1.






As might be expected there are oftea weapon or support systems
that meet several of the above criteria. The COIN project, for the
development of a counter insurgency airplane, is an example. It has a
potential effect on the United States military posture, production costs are
expected to exceed one hundred million dollars and since the airplane is
expected to be used by Military Assistance program countries as well as
all three United States Armed Forces, it will require extensive inter-
departmental, national and international coordination.^-
The Anti-Submarine Warfare project is an example of a project
that encompasses many closely related work efforts which taken together
exceed the RDT&3 and production figures. It also significantly affects
the United States military posture, necessitates national and inter-
national coordination, and requires that some efforts be conducted in *
concurrent manner.
2
In sucwary, the Department of Defense criteria for designating
project management include the mandatory designation of projects that
are considered as nationally urgent, mandatory designation of projects that
are expected to exceed twenty-five million dollars in RDT&E funding or one
hundred million dollars in production costs, and the optional designation
of projects not in one of the. first two groups but which meet certain
guidelines. The optional guidelines are of a general nature and require
subjective judgements, with the result that the Navy can undoubtedly





fit the situation. The result of the imposed requirements is that the
Navy oust designate certain weapon or support' systems as projects and
can designate as many additional ones as it desires.

CHAPTER VII
HOW THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE CRITERIA
WILL AFFECT THE NAVY
The mandatory requirement for selecting national urgency work
programs as designated projects will have little if any effect on the
Navy since such projects, Polaris for example, are now handled in this
manner. Likewise, the optional guidelines should have little effect on
the designation of projects by the Navy, unless the strong emphasis of
project management by the Department of Defense leads Navy officials
to believe that projects covered by the optional guidelines may not
truly be regarded as optional. The credence placed in project management
by the Department of Defense could easily cause the designation of
projects in order to protect the Navy Department in case it is ever
called upon by the Secretary of Defense to explain why a work effort is
not proceeding satisfactorily. In a situation such as this, the first
question asked might well be, "Why hasn't it been designated as a project?"
Although there may be a great deal of leeway in designating
projects under the optional guidelines, under the mandatory rules, the
requirements appear quite definitive. As of January, 1966 there were twenty
nine designated projects in the Department of the Navy (See Appendix I),
If the Navy designates as a project, every new or major modification of




developments that neet Department of Defense requirements, it will be
required to designate over fifty additional projects. * There is some
area at the present time for interpretation of the word "new." Since
many projects are older generations of earlier developments, the Navy
Department might be able to classify these as not "new" and therefore
not subject to the Department of Defense Directive. However, as tine
goes on,and as present programs are dropped,and new ones adopted all
will eventually become "new." The interpretation of what is "uew !; is
only a temporary expedient to avoid designating some projects.
With the prospect of a potential total of 75 to 100 designated
projects, with their corresponding managers, the question arises as to
how the special attention of top management can be obtained with such
a large number of designated projects. The current project managers have
been reasonably successful in gaining the attention of high Navy officials,
by such means as the Secretary of the Navy's Management Information
Center briefings, but with the prospect of three times the number of
present project managers thi attention may be diluted considerably.
A large increase in the number of project managers will probably
create competition for the limited number of qualified engineers and
managers that are available in the Navy, and as more project managers are
designated ,more talent will have to be taken from the functional bureaus,
the only available source. As a result the functional bureaus will have
more requirements placed on them by project managers with fewer t.ualified
*This information was obtained from a review of the fiscal records
of the Office of Naval Material.
'.
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people available to provide these required services.
One alternative to the mandatory requirement for designating as
projects all weapon and support systems involving a certain amount of
money
j
would be to drop this requirement and let the designation be based
on the optional guidelines. The use of project management could be
encouraged without arbitrary monetary requirements. Another possibility
that would reduce the number of potential designated projects would be
to raise the monetary limits. This would increase the discretionary
area for designation of projects and allow the exclusion of certain
large dollar work efforts that do not face significant technology, inter-
face, concurrency or coordination problems.
One course of action that might adapt itself to the present
mandatory requirements for project management , would entail a radical re-
organization of the material side of the Navy. The present organization,
despite the 1963 reorganization of the Navy, is composed of four independent
functional Bureaus. 3- Each has a historical function and has many of the
weaknesses of functional managers cited by Peter Drucker.2 Each has a
mission of operating certain functionally specialized shore activities and
each is the advisor to the Chief of Naval Operations and to the Chief of
Naval Personnel concerning a group of functionally specialized officers.
3
U. S. Department of the Navy, Assignment and Distribution of
Authority and Responsibility for the Administration of the Department
of the Navy , General Order No. 5, October 20, 1964.
HDrucker, op, cit .
3U. S. Department of the Navy, Assignment and Distribution of
Authority and Responsibility for Exercise of Shore (Field) Activities











The nature of these missions requires taking a parochial viewpoint. These
bureaus are supervised by the Chief of Naval Material but practical
limitations of staffing and funding, as well as the historical functional
missions, have permitted them to operate as autonomous organisations with
limited inter-coramunication. If the bureaus were essentially disestab-
lished and absorbed by the Office of Naval Material, the problems of the
functional managers could be reduced. Such a reorganization would permit
the project managers to operate more effectively and might result in
better conmunication between functional units, thereby reducing the need
for project management. The Dillon Report recommendations included at
least the first step in such a reorganization.*
In sunmary, the present rigid Department of Defense requirements
for designated projects will continue to expand their number. As a result
a form of organization and management, originated to control a few
especially high priority projects, will proliferate to include a large
number of projects. Many of these are neither urgent nor technically
complex but must be managed as if they were, solely because of the
dollar expenditures involved. The special attention given a few high
priority projects cannot, as a practical consideration, be provided to a
multiplied number of projects.
Review of the tlanagement of the Navy ,

CHAPTER VIII
PROJECT MANAGEMENT IN INDUSTRY
The advancement of technology since World War II has affected
industrial as well as governmental management. Like the Federal Govern-
ment, industrial organizations have also been seeking innovations in
management theories and techniques. Commercial firms have realized that
new products and marketing strategy often do not fit the purely functional
type of organization. Attempts have been made to mold the organization
around the task. A new type of managerial control is needed, as the
strictly functional organization does not meet the requirements of today's
complex conditions:
The pure functional approach cannot be applied when the task
involves the coordinated effort of hundreds of organizations and
people. Unique management relationships evolve in the development
of a large single-purpose project that cuts across interior organiza-
tional flows of authority and responsibility, and radiates outside
to independent organizations. The traditional management theory of
Henri Fayol and Frederick Taylor is not suitable for managing large,
single projects, such as those in the construction industry, or in
manufacturing when a costly product requires the coordinated in-
volvement of several organizations.*
Prior to the origin of project management, industrial fir^s used
"project expediters and "project coordinators." These individuals did
not actively enter into management functions, but instead they informally








motivated the persons doing the work, relying on diplomacy and persuasion
to remove bottlenecks in the management process.
*
The construction industry was one of the first to recognize the
need for a management process that permitted a unifying manager the
authority to cut across functional lines of the organization.2 This
approach was used in the construction of large single expensive projects
such as dams and turnpikes. Outside the construction industry the use
of project managers has been limited primarily to advanced technological
industries such as electronics, nucleonics, astronautics, avionics and
cryogenics. In these technical industries the project manager's job is
to create a product, a piece of advanced technological hardware. The
project manager in this kind of industry is dedicated to the attainment
of a goal within tirua, budget, and specification limitations. The
characteristics that differentiate him from the traditional manage
include
:
1. He is concerned with accomplishing specific projects that
require participation by organizational units outside his
direct control.
2. He conflicts with functional managers who must share authority
in their functional areas for the particular project.
3. Ha determines the when and what of project activities; the





3Paul 0. Gaddis, "The Project Manager," Harvard Business Review ,
(May-June 1959), p. 39.
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4. The project manager's task is finite; after the project is
completed personnel can be assigned to other activities.
5. A high percentage of the personnel supervised by the project
manager are professionals; conse^iuently he must use leader-
ship techniques other than the simple superior-subordinate
relationship.
6. The project manager does not normally possess any traditional
line authority over the functional organisations that support
him.l
Since most projects in private industry, other than those done
under contract for the government, do not involve national urgency, what
criteria are used for their establishment? A reviet? of the literature
on project management in industry indicates that there are few if any
guidelines that approach the precise definitions used by the Department
of Defense. Only generalities are found, such as the fact that project
management is useful for developing a new product or for managing aggregate
resources. In fact, there is a limited amou\it of literature concerning
the use of project management in industry. When it is discussed it is most
often in the context of the project manager for government contractor who
is doing work for a Department of Defense project manager. However, John F.
Mec, in describing a management philosophy for the future, writes of a form
Cleland, op. cit .
2
Joseph J. Jfoder and Cecil R. Phillips, Project Management With
CPH and KillT (New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1964.)
•.
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of management that closely resembles project management as practiced
by the Department of Defense:
If the professional-manager type so prevalent today ever
loses his competence to perform properly the management mission
in a changing environment in a dynamic economy, one possible type
of emerging management could be that of a group which would be
formed for particular tasks and consist of a combination of
technical specialists and professional generalists. The group
management type would operate for the purpose of achieving diffi-
cult objectives, after which there would »>e a regrouping of person-
nel to encourage creativity and avoid stagnation of a bureaucracy.^-
The history of project management in government and industry
seeus to indicate that the government, primarily the military establish-
ment, developed this technique and that industry is subsequently adapting
it to its needs.
John F. Mee, Management Thought in a Dynamic Economy (New York:




A current trend of management thinking centers around che estab-
lishment of predetermined objectives as a starting point for a philosophy
or practice of management; therefore, policies and goals must be decided
and a logical sequence of achieving those goals formulated before good
management techniques can be practical in operating an organization.
This logical sequence is a framework of coordinated objectives that
extends from the lowest to the highest levels of the organization and
provides constant direction to the broad overall goals. Such a philosophy
has been called management by objectives.
Lyndall F. Urwick states that, "Unless we have a purpose, there is
no reason why individuals should try to cooperate together at all or why
anyone should try to organize them. Every organization and every part of
every organization must be an expression of the purpose of the undertaking
concerned or it is meaningless and therefore redundant." 3,
Peter F. Drucker has written that management by objectives enables
a manager to control his own performance rather than having control imposed
from above, and that it results in stronger motivation, higher performance
goals and broader vision.
^
Lyndall F. Urwick, Notes on the Theory of Organization (New York:
American Management Association, 1952), pp. 18-19.
^Peter F. Drucker, The Practice of Management (New York: Harper







To make this philosophy of management effective, first the
objectives must be set; then management must establish a policy to
ensure that these objectives do not become static. Static objectives
eventually become as bad or worse than none at all. As old products
are discarded and new ones created, and as new markets are born, so must
new objectives be sat."
The final step under management by objectives is to implement
the objectives by insuring that every man in the organization understands
them. Unless this is done, tim organization will be no better off than
before. Iton-cotamunicated or misinterpreted objectives, like static ones,
can be worse than useless. The importance of this step has been high-
lighted in an article hy David S. Brown entitled, '"Importance of Under-
standing Objectives. ''^ This article al3o offers guidance in helping
others to understand the objectives. It recommends employee meetings,
agency publications, employee training and person to person relations as
methods to be used to achieve clear 'understanding of objectives.
Charles H, Granger in his article, "The Hierarchy of Objectives,"
has listed jevca points as 3 guide for deriving specific objectives from
broader ones:
1. State the broad objectives.
2. Establish tentative criteria in the form of key result
areas and standards for measuring the success of the broader
^George R. Terry, Principles of Management (Homewood, Illinois:
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1956), p. 150.
1
,. Bx*wn, ' - .. oca of Understanding Objectives,'






objectives, recognizing other objectives, and changing internal
and external conditions.
3. Create alternative sub-missions or sub-objectives to
attain broader objectives.
4. Analyze the effectiveness and the resources consumption
or costs of these alternative sub-objectives.
5. Select and state the preferred sub-objectives.
6. Repeat the foregoing process to minimize inconsistencies
and conflicts of the sub-objectives with each other and with the
broader objectives.
7. State the final sub-objectives .1
The philosophy of management by objectives, with its predetermined
objectives, derivation of sub-objectives, the logical sequence for
achieving the objectives, the constant review of objectives and the need
for complete understanding of the objectives at all levels, bears a
close resemblance to project management as practiced in the Department
of Defense.
The objectives of a designated project are established through
the planning, programming and budgeting system of the Department of
Defense and are expressed in the Five Year Force Structure and Financial
Plan. For large projects, approval beyond the Secretary of Defense must
be obtained from the Bureau of the Budget, the President and Congress.
After approval through these channels, more explicit objectives are
derived and promulgated in the initiating charter for the project.
The designated project manager and his staff must prepare a




project master plan.'- Objectives of the project are continually reviewed
in the process of considering trade-offs.
The very nature of a designated project, with its goal of
developing a weapon system, and participation in preparation of plans
by most of the project manager's staff insures that the objectives will
be well understood at all levels of the project management organization.
Among contemporary management theorists, there is definite lack
of unanimity on the various management philosophies. Harold Koontz has
pictured the situation as • . • "a jungle of confusion and conflict . • ."
in his article, "Making Sense of Management Theory."2 However, if
management by objectives is a good philosophy then project management
as utilized in the Department of Defense is theoretically sound manage-
ment.
The philosophy of management by objectives seems to correlate
well with project management but it is not necessarily helpful in deciding
what criteria should be used in establishing designated projects. The
same philosophy could be used by managers directing weapon or support
systems that are not designated projects. The search for sound criteria to
use in selecting designated projects finds only limited and general guide-
lines in contemporary management theory.
i
Project Master Plan.
2Harold Koontz, "Making Sense of Management Theory," Harvard




Project management in the Navy is a specialized, intensive form
of organization used to direct specifically designated work efforts.
Projects and project managers are selected by the Secretary of the Navy,
the Chief of Naval Material or the Chief of a Navy Bureau. Usually
designated projects have as an objective the development of a weapon system,
but in certain cases it may be the development of a logistic sub-system.
The project manager of a designated project is issued a charter
which establishes the general objective of the project, scope of authority,
responsibility, operating relationships and any special delegation of
authority or exemptions from existing regulations.
When a project has substantially obtained its objectives it is
reviewed for possible disestablishment. Each charter assigns a date for
the first such review, and as goals are reached the project is eventually
abolished.
The general objective of project management is to decrease the
lead-time necessary to develop a system from its conceptual stage to a
functioning operational end product. This is accomplished by assigning
one executive to carry out a single purpose and providing him with the










This reducr.ion of lead -time is required under the present world
situation which seems to indicate that future wars will be won or lost
through the use of forces in existence at the beginning of hostilities.
The United States can no longer rely on industrial mobilization begun
after the start of a war in order to insure victory.
Project management for the development of a weapon was first
used during World War II to produce the atonic bomb. Since then it has
been used to develop intercontinental missiles, nuclear power for sub-
marines, anti-aircraft systems and anti-missile systems. More recently
the military services, under Department of Defense prodding, have used
project ;aanagement for many less urgent projects.
A detailed and formalized planning procedure in the Navy precedes
the time when a decision must be made as to whether or not a weapon or
support system will be selected as a designated project. Those projects
not selected for project management are managed by one of the functional
bureaus of the Navy.
The subject of project management is a source of controversy among
Navy top managers. It is generally felt chat project management is
effective but that it is expensive in the use of managerial and technical
talent. This infers the probability that project management cannot be
used for an unlimited number of weapon or support systems. The record of
project management is good with respect to delivery on time and performance
of weapon systems. The costs of these systems have always greatly exceeded
original estimates but it is not clear whether project managers were at






The disadvantages of project management include the establishment
of an "elite' ; group, which is likely to cause poor morale in the rest of
the organization. In addition, the extensive documentation and reporting
and the need for special training for personnel assigned to a project
manager's staff make project management expensive.
The record of the early project managers in developing weapons in
a short time caused the Department of Defense to search for guidelines to
use for establishing a greater number of designated projects, A con-
tractor was hired co perform a study and a conference was held with
Defense personnel to search for the right criteria. In May 1965, the
Department of Defense issued an instruction, based on the results of the
study and conference, Hhlcfa requires the use of project management under
certain conditions and makes it optional under others.
The mandatory requirements for usin^ designated projects will
cause an increase in the number of such projects from 29 to between 75
and 100. This increase will dilute the special attention by top Navy
management accorded currently designated projects which are the truly
high priority projects.
Industry recognises the advantages of project management for
certain situations but uses it less than the government and can offer
little useful criteria for the selection of designated projects.
At least one contemporary management philosophy, management by
objectives, correlates closely with current practice under project manage-
ment, but since it is also adaptable to non-designated work efforts, it
provides little useful guidance for the selection of designated projects.

This investigation of project management, and of the search for
criteria to use in the selection of designated projects has led to several
conclusions.
To be selected as a designated project, a weapon or support
system should meet one or more of the following criteria;
1. Have a significant effect on military capability and be
considered nationally urgent.
2. Have, or be expected to have, major technological difficulties.
3. Require extensive coordination with other military departments,
federal agencies or foreign governments
.
4. Be a complex developmental program undertaken on a concurrent
basis.
A weapon or support system program should not be designated as a
project solely on the basis of expected volume of expenditures.
The history of project management indicates that it has developed
successful weapon systems in much less time than originally estimated and
can be expanded to cover a limited number of programs other than those of
national urgency.
Implementation of the 1965 Department of Defense mandatory require-
ments for the use of project management will greatly increase the number of
the Navy's designated projects. This increase will dilute the currently
available technical and managerial talent and may cause delays in the
nationally urgent projects.
The Department of Defense should promulgate a more flexible policy




WEAPON SYSTEMS DESIGNATED FOR PROJECT MANAGEMENT, NAVY DEPARTMENT
As of January 1, 1966
A. Designated by the Secretary of the Navy
Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBK) Project 2
Surface Missile System (SMS) Project 3
Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems (ASUS) Project A
Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project (FDL) Project 5
B. Designated by the Chief of Naval Material
F-111B Aircraft Project 6
Instrumentation Ships (IS) Project 7
All-Weather Carrier Landing System (ACLS) Project 8
Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations
and Naval Intelligence Processing System Project 9 (REWSON)
Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Systems IFF/MARK XLL
Systems Project 10 (AIMSO)
OMEGA Navigation Systems Project 11
C. Designated by the Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons
E-2A/ ATDS Project 12
F-4 Sparrow Project 13
A-6/EA 6 Aircraft Project 14
A-5Ra-5 Aircraft Project 15
A-7 Aircraft Project 16
OV-10 (COIN) Aircraft Project 17
DASH Helicopter Project 18
Integrated Avionics System Project 19
Shrike Weapon System Project 20
Walleye Weapon System Project 21
ASROC Missile Weapon System Project 22
Munitions Project 23
F-8 Aircraft Weapon System Project 24
P3A Aircraft Project 25




D. Designated by the Chief, Bureau of Ships
Acoustics and Torpedo Countermeasures System Project 27
Sattelite Communications Project 28
Spanish Ships Support Project 29
DOCUMENTS DESIGNATING THE ABOVE PROJECTS
Designated by the Secretary of the Navy
. Fleet Ballistic Missile (FBM) Project . (SECNAV 5430.64)
Washington: 26 February, 1964.
Surface Missile System (SMS) Project . (SECNAV 5430.56A)
Washington: 26 February, 1964.
Anti-Submarine Warfare Systems (ASWS) Project . (SECNAV 5430.68)
Washington: 2 July, 1964.
Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project (FPL) . (SECNAV 5430.75)
Washington: 18 October, 1965.
Designated by the Chief of Naval Material
. F-111B Aircraft Project (NAVMAT 5410.6)
Washington: October, 1965.
. Instrumentation Ships (IS) Project (NAVMAT 5410.3)
Washington: 24 January, 1964.
. All-Weather Carrier Landing System (ACLS) Project . (NAVMAT 5430.14)
Washington: 16 June, 1964.
. Reconnaissance, Electronic Warfare, Special Operations and Naval
Intelligence Processing System iRBWSON) . (NAVMAT 05430.17)
Washington: 22 October, 1964.
. Air Traffic Control Radar Beacon Systems (ATRBS) IFF/MARK XII
Systems Project (AIMS) (NAVMAT 5410.4).
Washington: 24 February, 1965.
. OMEGA Navigation System Project (NAVMAT 5410.5)
Washington, 18 June, 1965.
•
61
Designated by the Chief, Bureau of Naval Weapons
.
E-2A/ATDS Project . (BUWEPS 5430.15) Chief of Bureau of
Naval Weapons. Washington: December, 1964.
. F-4 Sparrow Project . (BUWSPS 5430.22). Washington:
20 July, 1965.
. A-6/EA 6 Aircraft Project . (BUWEPS 5430.22)
Washington: 20 July, 1965.
.
A-5/RA5 Aircraft Project . (BUWEPS Ifeao C:ERE)
Washington: 17 March, 1964.
. OV-10 (COIN) Aircraft Project . (BUWEPS 5430.23)
Washington: 20 July, 1965.
. DASH Helicopter Project . (BUWSPS Memo CU-7:TCH)
Washington: IS December, 1963.
. Integrated Avionics System Project . (BUWEPS 5430.19)
Washington: 23 April, 1965.
. Shrike Weapon System Project . (BUWEPS 5430.21)
Washington: 23 April, 1965.
. Walleye Weapon System Project . (BUWEPS 5430.26)
Washington: 16 August, 1965.
. ASROC Missile Weapon System Project . (BUWEPS 5430.24)
Washington: 22 July, 1965.
. Munitions Project . (BUWEPS 5430.25)
Washington: 27 July, 1965.
. F-8 Aircraft Weapon System Froject
.
(BUWEPS 5430.27)
Washington: 15 October, 1965.
. P3A Aircraft Project . (BUWEPS 5430.28)
Washington: 23 November, 1965.
. VTAX foilci-Hission Fighter Attack Aircraft . (BUWEPS 5430.29)
Washington: 26 November, 1965.
.
A-7 Aircraft Project . (BUWEPS 2-feoo C:C1C)
Washington: 26 September, 1964.
.
62
Designated by the Chief, Bureau of Ships
. Acoustics and Torpedo Countermeasures System Project
.
(BUSHIPS
5432.1) Chief of Bureau of Ships. Washington: October, 1964.
. Satellite Communication Project . (BUSHIPS 5432.1)
Washington: 22 April, 1965.
. Spanish Ships Support Project . (BUSHIPS 5432.1)




U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations. Report on the
Organization and Kaaagement of the Missile Programs
.
(HR 1121);
86th Cong. 1st Sess., 1959.
U. S. Department of Defense. Project Definition Phase . (Department of
Defense Directive No. 3200.9); Washington: Hq., Department of
Defense, 1964.
. Systems/Project Management . (Directive No. 5010.14). Wash-
ington: Hq., Department of Defense, 1965.
. Department of Defense Weapon Systems Management Center .
(Directive No. 5160.55); Washington: Hq., Department of Defense,
1965.
. Ad hoc study group. Manned Aircraft Weapon Systems: A Program
for Reducing the Time Cycle From Concept to Inventory . Washington:
Hq., Department of Defensa, 1956, declassified in 1960.
..
Conference on Program Management, Conference Proceedings .
Washington: Hq., Department of Defense, 1963.
U. S. Department of the Navy. Report of the Committee on Organization of
the Department of the Navy
.
(NAV EXOS P-1996); Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1959.
. Review of the Management of the Navy . Washington: Hq.,
Department of the Navy, 1962.
. Assignment and Distribution of Authority and Responsibility for
Exercise of Command and Support of Shore (Field) Activities of the
Department of the Navy
.
(General Order No. 19); Washington: Hq.,
Department of the Navy, 1964.
. Assignment and Distribution of Authority and Responsibility for
the Administration of the Department of the Navy . (General Order
No. 5); Washington: Hq., Department of the Navy. 1964.
Fast Deployment Logistic Ship Project; Department of the Navy
Organization and Responsibilities for . (Secretary of the Navy





„. Project Management in the Department of the Navy . Secretary
of the Navy Instruction 5000.21A). Washington: Hq., Department
of the Navy, 1965.
-• Department of the Navy RDT&E Management Guide . (NAVSO P-2457).
Washington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
_.
Budget Digest. Fiscal Year 196o . (NAVSO P-1355). Washington:
U. S. Government Printing Office, 1965.
-• Fleet Ballistic Missile Project; Navy Department Organization
and Responsibilities for . (Secretary of the Navy Instruction No.
5430.64). Washington: Hq., Department of the Navy, 1964.
-• Surface Missile Systems Project; Navy Department Organization
and Responsibilities for . Secretary of the Navy Instruction No.
5430.56A. Washington: H^., Department of the Navy, 1964.
m.
Technical Development Plan . Chief of Naval Operations
Instruction No. 3910.4B. Washington: Hq., Department of the
Navy, 1964.
Specific Operacional Requirements and Tentative Specific
Operational Requireiaents ; Instructions for Preparation of . Chief
of Naval Operations Instruction No. ';910.6B. Washington: Hq.,
Department of the Navy, 1964.
_• Proposed Technical Approach; Instructions for Preparation of .
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction No. 3910.8. Washington:
Hq., Department of the Navy, 1964.
„. General Operational Requirements, Instructions for Preparation of.
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 3910.9. Washington: Hq.,
Department of the Navy, 1964.
-• Project Management in the Naval Material Support Establishment .
"Chief of Naval Material Instruction No. 5000, 5A, 1965.
_• Exploratory Development Requirements . Chief of Naval Material
Instruction No. 3910.4. Washington: Office of Naval Material,
1965.
_• Guide for the Preparation of Project Master Plans . Chief of
Naval Material Instruction No. 5200.11. Washington: U. S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1965.
-• Naval Material Support Establishment; Initial Operations of .





_• Designated Projects Under the Command of the Chief of Naval
Material. Chief of Naval Material Notice No. 5430. Washington:
Office of Naval Material, 1965.
..
From Polaris to Deep Ocean Technology . Special Projects Office
Publication. Washington: Bureau of Naval Weapons, 1964.
Books
Baumgartner, John S. Project Management . Horaewood, Illinois: Richard
D. Irwin luc, 1963.
Blair, Clay Jr. The Atomic Submarine and Admiral Rickover . New York:
Henry Holt and Co., 1954.
Drueleer, Peter. The Practice of Management . New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1954.
Hitch, Charles J., and McKean, Roland N. The Economics of Defense in the
Nuclear Age. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960.
Mee, John F. Management Thought in a Dynamic Economy . New York: New
York University Press, 1963.
Moder, Joseph J. and Phillips, Cecil R. Project Management with CPM and
PERT . New York: Reinhold Publishing Corporation, 1964.
Peck, Mertou J., and Scherer, Frederick Ii. The Weapons Acquisition
Process: An Economic Analysis . Boston: Graduate School of
Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962.
Terry, George R. Principles of Management . Homewood, 111.: Richard D.
Irwin, Inc., 1956.
Urwick, Lyndall F. Notes on the Theory of Organisation . New York:
American Management /issociation, 1952.
Articles
Brown, Daniel S. 'Importance of Understanding Objectives," The Federal
Accountant , (March, 1964), 64-76.
Cleland, Daniel I., "Why Project Management:' 1 Business Horizons , (/.inter,
1964), pp. 31.
Coleman, J. L. "COIN Project Develops Multi-Service Aircraft,"




Estes, Howell M., Lt. Gen. "You Must Provide a Streamlined Procedure,"
Armed Forces Management , (December 1961), 14-15.
Gaddis, Paul 0, "The Project Managers," Harvard Business Revie\7 (May-
June 1959), 89-97.
Healey, V. ?. "ASW Systems Project Office Responsible for Technical
Effort," Navy Management Review (Washington: December 1965 and
January 1966), 22-23.
Koontz, Harold, ,: Making Sense of Management Theory/' Harvard Business
Review, (July-August, 1962), 24-34.
Livingston, J. Sterling. 'Decision Making in Weapons Development,'
Harvard Business Review (January-February, 1958), 127-136.
Moore, William C, Capt. USE. "All Echelons State Policy and Project
Management," Navy Management Review (December 1965 and January
1966), 7-8.
Washington Post . 1365.
Unpublished Material
Beggs, J. M. Program Management — Authority and Responsibility, A
Contractor's View . Paper read before the Department of Defense
Conference on Program. Hew London, Conn.: May 15, 1963.
Kuhl, Earl. Speech before the Navy Financial Management Class, January
12, 1966.
Ramo, Simon. The Program Manager — Substance or Symbol . Paper read
before the Defense Conference on Program Management, New London,
Conn.: May 15, 1963.
United Research, Inc. The Extension of Special Organizational Patterns
and Management Techniques to Additional Weapon Systems . A report
Prepared for the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations
and Logistics), January, 1962.
U. S. Department of Defense. "Discussion Outlines for the Defense Con-
ference on Program Management." Washington: 1963.
. Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Resources Management
Systems /Project Management . Unpublished Report, May 28, 1965.
m. "Defense Conference on Program Management." A letter to the




« Bureau of Naval Weapons. "List of Topics for Defense Con-
ference on Program Management." Washington: 1963.
Interviews
U. S. Department of the Navy. Office of Itaval Material. Personal inter-
views with voetabers of the Planning Division, iianageraent and
Organisation Division, and Personnel Division. Washington:
January, 1966.
m.
Office of Naval Material. Personal interview with Mr. Al
Cook, Project Analyst, Project Management Branch, Office of
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